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Policy makers aim to avoid banking crises, and although they can to some extent control domestic
conditions, internationally transmitted crises are difficult to tackle. This paper identifies international
contagion in banking during the 2007–2009 crisis for 54 economies. We identify three channels of con-
tagion – systematic, idiosyncratic and volatility – and find evidence for these in 45 countries. Banking
crises are overwhelmingly associated with the presence of both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion.
The results reveal that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign jurisdiction via idiosyncratic contagion
increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in the domestic banking system by almost 37 percent, whereas
increased exposure via systematic contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking
system. Thus while policy makers and regulatory authorities are rightly concerned with the systematic
transmission of banking crises, reducing the potential for idiosyncratic contagion can importantly reduce
the consequences for the domestic economy.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction This paper empirically examines the evidence for the unex-Banking crises are costly, and a great deal of prudential effort is
undertaken to avoid them. Bordo et al. (2001) estimate losses of
around 6 percent of GDP associated with a banking crisis in the last
quarter of the 20th century, whilst Laeven and Valencia (2013) doc-
ument losses of about 30 percent of GDP during the global financial
crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Maintaining sound macroeconomic fun-
damentals, a clear legal framework and strong prudential oversight
are preventativemeasures within the remit of domestic authorities.
However, banking crises transmitted from other jurisdictions pre-
sent a considerable risk to the domestic economy (Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2013), particularly as banking crises are often observed to
precede even more costly currency and debt crises (Laeven and
Valencia, 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).pected international transmission of banking crises via stressful
conditions in financial markets during 2007–2009. These
transmissions are beyond those which would occur by the known
spillovers between banking sectors in different jurisdictions due to
trading or portfolio links or institutional structures such as interna-
tional subsidiaries, and instead consist of contagion effects; see
also van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), Bae et al. (2003), Bekaert
et al. (2005), Corsetti et al. (2005), Dungey et al. (2005) and
Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Although the crisis is often seen as
having origins in overheated housing markets and the associated
mortgage backed securities market, we concentrate on the
international transmission of this stress which Aalbers (2009)
forecefully argues is due to the financial intermediaries rather than
the localized housing markets themselves.1 We find significant
evidence not only for the existence of contagion between banking
sectors, but also for its role in promoting banking crises in regions
geographically removed from the crisis source. Thus, we contribute
to the growing body of literature examining the role of banks in
the transmission of financial crisis of 2007–2009, most of whom find
evidence of international transmission via the banking sector (Allenumber of
nd loose
se price
on.
2 Our approach does not distinguish between parent and subsidiary institutions.
There is some evidence that supports the transmission of liquidity shocks from parent
to international subsidiary institutions in Allen et al. (2014). As this distinction
requires balance sheet data and firm level characteristics we leave this extension for
future research.
3 See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) for a recent theoretical contribution.
272 M. Dungey, D. Gajurel / Journal of Banking & Finance 60 (2015) 271–283et al., 2014; Brealey et al., 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013; Popov
and Udell, 2012).
The model encapsulates several potential channels of contagion
and testable hypotheses in a single framework. Specifically, it
captures potential structural changes in global systematic risk
exposure (systematic contagion), additional US idiosyncratic
shocks (idiosyncratic contagion), a structural shift (shift conta-
gion), and additional US volatility spillovers to other markets
(volatility contagion). The latter captures the argument that
financial markets exhibit explosive volatility during crises that
may spillover to other markets (Edwards, 1998; Engle, 2004;
Hamao et al., 1990). Using a standard factor model representation
of an international CAPM framework, the model allows for
spillover effects outside crisis periods (Kim, 2001; Laxton and
Prasad, 2000), volatility spillovers, heteroskedasticity and skew-
ness in the financial data with a nested EGARCH specification.
The framework is most closely related to the models of Baur
(2012), Bekaert et al. (2014), Bekaert et al. (2005) and Dungey
et al. (2005). As the crisis is widely accepted to have originated
in the US we consider contagion effects from the US to 53 country
banking sector indices - covering both non-crisis and crisis
conditions from 2001 to 2009.
There are two major results. First, we categorize the evidence
for contagion between the 54 banking sectors. The banking sectors
in most economies experienced contagion from the US in some
form – that is systematic, idiosyncratic, shift or volatility – but
not necessarily all forms. About 60 percent of our sample banking
markets experienced a break in global systematic risk exposure
and about 60 percent of banking markets in our sample experi-
enced idiosyncratic contagion originating from the US banking
market. While most of the banking markets have volatility
spillovers from the US banking market in non-crisis periods, the
evidence for volatility contagion during the crisis is more mixed
– when we divide the crisis into two phases volatility contagion
is limited in the first phase and more prevalent in the second
phase. Finally, shift contagion is always accompanied by other
forms of contagion.
The second contribution links evidence on contagion to the
occurrence of banking crises. Linking our results for contagion with
the systemic banking crisis data in Laeven and Valencia (2013)
reveals that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign jurisdiction
via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic
crisis in the domestic banking system by almost 37 percent,
whereas increased global systematic risk exposure via systematic
contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking
system. The existing literature argues that the probability of sys-
temic banking crises is reduced by stronger regulatory capital
(Acharya et al., 2010; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole, 2012;
Miles et al., 2013), the size of the banking sector and higher market
concentration (Allen and Gale, 2000; Beck et al., 2006; Bretschger
et al., 2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013), and reduced activity in the sha-
dow banking sector (De Jonghe, 2010; Lepetit et al., 2008). We find
that stronger regulatory capital, retail banking activities and higher
market concentration lead to a reduced probability of banking cri-
sis even in the presence of contagion effects. The evidence suggests
a larger economic impact of stronger regulatory capital, where a 1
percent increase over current level reduces the probability of a cri-
sis by around 15 percent, than for the proportion of non-interest
income in total income, where a 1 percent decrease in income
from this source decreases the probability of a crisis by less than
2 percent. Likewise, domestic conditions can help ameliorate the
probability of crises; increased banking assets as a proportion of
GDP lower the probability of crisis, but the economic impact is very
small. An increase in the external debt to GDP ratio also increases
the probability of crisis, consistent with the hypothesis that a
feedback loop exists between sovereign debt and banking crises(Acharya et al., 2014; Adler, 2012). We extend the model to
include interaction effects between contagion sources and the
bank capital, and find that this interaction effect significantly
decreases the probability of a banking crisis over the effects of
the contagion channels alone.
The results indicate that the systematic contagion effects pre-
sent in these markets during this crisis could not have been
reduced by further banking regulatory measures such as increased
capital requirements. However, there is scope for further reduction
in the probability of banking crises promoted by international
linkages via idiosyncratic contagion. Idiosyncratic contagion occurs
in response to unanticipated country-specific banking sector
shocks, and represents the transmission of these shocks other than
via usual linkages such as portfolios, subsidiary or trading links
which are also present during non-crisis periods, but perhaps
consistent with arguments around herd behavior. Potentially there
is gain for regulators and policy makers to consider how to
creatively respond to calm these transmissions from extra vulner-
ability generated in one economy, but unexpectedly transmitting
to another.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we
propose a model to test for several forms of contagion and describe
the sample and data. Section 3 provides the results for contagion.
In Section 4 we examine the cross-section of systemic banking
crisis. Section 5 provides robustness checks for the results and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Modeling financial contagion
2.1. The empirical framework
In modern banking systems, banking institutions are often glob-
ally integrated through both on-balance sheet and off-balance
sheet linkages.2 These global linkages make the banking sector
potentially more exposed to global systematic risk than other sec-
tors. The financial sector is known to be highly globally integrated
at sectoral level (Bekaert et al., 2009). We postulate that in a globally
integrated banking system the exposure of banks in a given country
to global systematic risk depends on the extent of global integration
of the banking system.3 We utilize a CAPM style framework based on
a factor approach rather than based on observed linkages such as
trade, subsidiary relationships or bank capital flows. The advantage
of our approach is that it does not require an exhaustive and mutu-
ally exclusive list of data, but with the disadvantage that the exact
source of the transmission in terms of observed variables is not
available. The approach is related to the latent factor specifications
used in the literature reviews of Corsetti et al. (2005) and Dungey
et al. (2005) who both show how other frameworks to test contagion
are nested within this general specification.
Let ri;t represent the return for banking sector of country i at
time t. A standard international market model representation of
asset returns takes the following form:
ri;t ¼ a0;i þ a1;if globalt þ ei;t ; ð1Þ
where f global refers to global factor or common shock and can be
proxied by the return on the aggregate global banking sector index
and a1;i measures the global systematic risk exposure of banking
sector of country i. This approach removes the common global
effects from individual index returns.
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systematic risk exposure of banking markets through a number
of possible channels. For example, the interbank market may not
function properly during a crisis period; the existing network of
relationships across the market participants may break down, or
the failure of a few financial institutions may have a systemic
impact on other banks. The potential increased exposure of banks
to global systematic risk during a crisis period is denoted as
systematic contagion, and is analogous to a common shocks effect
or fundamentals based contagion (Baur, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2005,
2014) as revealed in (2) below:ri;t ¼ a0;i þ a1;if globalt þ a2;if globalt It þ ei;t; ð2Þwhere It is an indicator function that takes value 0 during the nor-
mal period and 1 during a crisis period. The coefficient a2;i captures
the changes in global systematic risk exposure during the crisis
period.
Policy intervention in the financial system during crisis periods
is often specifically designed to reduce an individual country’s glo-
bal systematic risk exposure. If the policy measures were effective,
then the global systematic risk exposure of a given banking market
may have been reduced during the crisis instead of increased.4 This
is akin to the debate around whether increased international
financial integration contributes to increased output correlation
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013).
The existing literature suggests that US shocks have a signifi-
cant influence on other economies during calm periods, reflecting
its market leadership in many segments of the economy, its influ-
ence in portfolios, and the position of the US dollar as the major
global reserve currency. Following Masson (1999), we denote these
as spillover effects. We control for these relationships by specifically
including a US factor in the mean specification to capture the
known relationships between market i and the US, shown below
in (3). However, during a period of stress, shocks from the crisis-
originating economy may impact over and above these spillovers,
denoted as idiosyncratic contagion, (Dungey et al., 2005; Dungey
and Martin, 2007). In the current paper we denote the US banking
sector as the crucible of the crisis and consider the evidence for
idiosyncratic contagion from the US to other markets. Further,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that a crisis may bring a struc-
tural shift in the existing relationships exceeding that accounted
for by structural breaks in factor relationships; potentially attribu-
table to herd behavior amongst investors which does not depend
on economic fundamentals (Bekaert et al., 2014). Our final levels
specification captures each of these channels as follows:rj;t ¼ bj;0 þ b1;jf globalt þ b2;jf globalt It þ b3;jf USt þ b4;jf USt It þ b5;jIt þ nj;t ;
j ¼ 1; . . . ;n 1 – US ð3Þ5 Robustness to a TARCH specification shows very similar results to those reportedwhere the US factor, f US, is extracted as the residual from applying
(2) to i ¼ US, thus orthogonalizing the global and US factors. In (3),
the coefficient b1;j represents a standard CAPM beta coefficient
against global markets, b2;j represents systemic contagion, b3;j mea-
sures the general spillover effects of US shocks, b4;j measures the
additional effects of US shocks during the crisis period, that is
idiosyncratic contagion, and b5;j captures any intercept shift in the
factor model representation or shift contagion during the crisis
period.4 However, the alternative to reduced global exposure is not necessarily proof of
lack of policy efficacy as we do not have a true proxy of what the outcome would have
been in the absence of policy actions.2.2. The GARCH framework and measuring volatility contagion
Financial returns series generally exhibit heteroskedasticity. To
capture this we incorporate the exponential generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) model of
Nelson (1991), which has the advantage that it does not require
non-negativity constraints on parameters. We implement EGARCH
to accommodate potential asymmetry in leverage effects in
preference to a threshold GARCH specification because we wish
to capture the entire distribution in preference to volatility tails
in this framework.5 A GARCH(1,1) is chosen, corresponding to the
existing evidence that this is usually sufficient to capture the
volatility clustering properties of financial data (Engle, 2004;
Hansen and Lunde, 2005). The variance equation of the EGARCH
model to accompany mean equations given in (1–3) is expressed as:
lnðr2i;tÞ ¼ c0;i þ c1;iðjzi;t1j  Ejzi;t1jÞ þ c2;izi;t1 þ c3;ilnðr2i;t1Þ;
zi;t1 ¼ gi;t1=ri;t1;gi;t ¼ fei;t ; ei;t ; nj;tg
gi;t  Student  tð0;r2i;tÞ:
ð4Þ
To capture the US volatility spillover effects in the variance
equation of the non-US markets, the variance equation for those
markets takes the following form:
lnðr2j;tÞ ¼ c0;j þ c1;jðjzj;t1j  Ejzj;t1jÞ þ c2;jzj;t1 þ c3;jlnðr2j;t1Þ
þ p1;jlnðr^2us;tÞ þ p2;jlnðr^2us;tÞIt ; j ¼ 1; . . . ;n 1– US: ð5Þ
In (5), theparameter estimatep1;j captures the generalUSvolatil-
ity spillover andp2;j captures the additionalUS volatility spillover for
market j during the crisis period which we denote as volatility con-
tagion. The GARCH framework provided in (5) is motivated by
Hamao et al. (1990), Engle et al. (1990), Edwards (1998) and
Iwatsubo and Inagaki (2007), amongst others.6 The volatility specifi-
cation could be extended to include global and US influences in a sim-
ilarmanner to that applied to themean equation. However, given that
existing evidence strongly supports that a single source is sufficient to
capture GARCH effects in global models (Bekaert et al., 2005; Dungey
et al., 2005;Dungey et al., 2015), and that introducingmultipleGARCH
interactions into the framework adds significant computational com-
plexity we opt for the more tractable specification of (5). Robustness
tests support this modeling choice.
2.3. Sample, data and crisis period
The data set comprise daily banking sector indices available from
Thomson Reuters Datastream for the sample period of January 2,
2001 to May 8, 2009. These banking indices are constructed by
Thomson Reuters Datastream as Industry Classification Benchmark
DatastreamLevel 2 indices, containing the stocks in the banking sec-
tor for each country where data are available. The mnemonics for
these indices are given as banksxx where xx indicates the country
mnemonic commonly applied in this database service. To represent
the global factor we use the Datastream mnemonic bankswdwhich
aggregates themarket indices into aworld index, intended to cover a
minimumof 75–80 percent of total market capitalization from each
market (the results are robust to the alternative of using either the
global banking index less the USmarket, bankswu, or the total global
equity index, totmkwd, as the global factor). For more details on
either the global or country banking indices see the Datastream
Global Equity Indices User Guide.here.
6 There is a long line of literature that examines volatility spillovers in international
financial markets. See for example, Chiang and Wang (2011), Diebold and Yilmaz
(2009), Edwards and Susmel (2001), Hamao et al. (1990), Jung and Maderitsch (2014),
King and Wadhwani (1990) and Susmel and Engle (1994).
Table 1
List of banking markets considered.
America Europe
1 USA 28 Austria
2 Argentina 29 Belgium
3 Brazil 30 Bulgaria
4 Canada 31 Cyprus
5 Chile 32 Czech Rep
6 Colombia 33 Denmark
7 Mexico 34 Finland
8 Peru 35 France
9 Venezuela 36 Germany
Africa and Asia 37 Greece
10 Australia 38 Hungary
11 China 39 Ireland
12 Egypt 40 Italy
13 Hong Kong 41 Luxemburg
14 India 42 Malta
15 Indonesia 43 Netherlands
16 Israel 44 Norway
17 Japan 45 Poland
18 Malaysia 47 Romania
19 Morocco 48 Russia
20 Pakistan 49 Slovenia
21 Philippine 50 Spain
22 Singapore 51 Sweden
23 South Africa 52 Switzerland
24 South Korea 46 Portugal
25 Sri Lanka 53 Turkey
26 Taiwan 54 UK
27 Thailand
7 The statistically significant parameter estimates for c1 and c2 for most of the
markets support the EGARCH specification in (5).
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we are able to use 54 of these countries in our study – the omitted
countries (Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates) have a limited
data sample. Table 1 provides the list of banking markets covered.
In line with existing literature, we use two-day rollingmoving aver-
ages to deal with differing time zones and asynchronous trading
times as in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and adjust time/date as
Day 1 in US/Americas = Day 2 in Africa, Asia and Europe. We follow
the approach of Wang and Nguyen Thi (2012) and define the crisis
period endogenously using the iterative cumulative sum of square
(ICSS) algorithm based on the CUSUM test to detect the structural
change in variance of an individual return series (Inclan and Tiao,
1994; Sanso et al., 2004) and use the identified break in theUS bank-
ing sector index return to determine the crisis period. Using this pro-
cedure theendogenously chosencrisis period is fromJuly19, 2007 to
May 8, 2009. These dates are consistent with the existing literature,
see Bekaert et al. (2014) and the extensive overview of dates pro-
vided in Dungey et al. (2015). For robustness we have also checked
the results with a start date of August 9, 2007, a date often used in
the crisis literature as it is consistentwith the beginning of European
Central Bank (ECB) interventions in themarket. The results are qual-
itatively similar.
3. Contagion results and discussion
The resulting evidence for contagion for 53 individual banking
markets taking the US banking market as a crisis-originating
market is reported in Table 2. Almost every banking market in
our sample has a statistically significant and positive systematic
comovement with the global banking market throughout the sam-
ple, evidenced by b1 – 0, indicating exposure to global systematic
risk. The parameter estimates support that the level of global
integration is higher for advanced countries; consistent with
evidence in Laeven and Valencia (2013). These cross-border
linkages may reflect both on and off balance sheet channels
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Sbracia and Zaghini, 2003).
The results provide evidence for the severity of disruptions in
the 2007–2009 crisis. Exposure to the global systematic risk factor
changed significantly for 31 of the 53 countries, that is b2 – 0 as
reported in Table 2, consistent with these markets experiencing
systematic contagion during the crisis, and also with prior
evidence on structural breaks in the relationship with global con-
ditions during crisis periods (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Dungey
et al., 2005). However, this evidence is strongly skewed towards
the developing markets. Many of the advanced markets did not
experience a structural break, that is the hypothesis of b2 ¼ 0 is
not rejected in France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, Portugal and
the UK. We cannot distinguish here whether the policy actions
undertaken were sufficient to offset any potential change, or
whether no change was experienced. In Japan, Germany, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, the results go further
in that the hypothesis that b2 < 0 is not rejected. In these countries
the potential for an increased factor loading (b2) during the crisis,
which was observed in other jurisdictions, was not present, and
this may reflect that their policy initiatives were effective in
suppressing the transmission of the crisis to the domestic banking
system, in line with the findings of Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012).
Bulgaria, Colombia, Peru, Sri Lanka and Venezuela did not have
a significant link with the global factor during the pre-crisis period
b1 ¼ 0; which possibly reflects the relatively small closed nature of
these economies. However, during the crisis, this was no longer the
case for Bulgaria, Colombia and Peru, (b2 – 0) and they were
exposed to global conditions, although Sri Lanka and Venezuela
continued to remain isolated in this respect.
In addition to responding to global conditions, the majority of
markets also experienced spillovers from the US during thenon-crisis periods. Of the 53 markets, 30 experienced idiosyncratic
shocks from the US banking market, evidenced by b3 – 0. The nota-
ble exceptions are from both advanced banking markets (Australia,
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Korea, Norway,
Portugal and Taiwan) and emerging banking markets (China,
Indonesia, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey
and Venezuela). When b3 is negative, it indicates the potential
for portfolio diversification benefits relative to the US, which is
the case for a mixture of advanced markets such as Japan,
Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia and emerging markets such as
Brazil, Chile, India, Pakistan, and Philippines. However, this effect
appears to be dampened during the crisis, as the US idiosyncratic
effects have an overwhelmingly positive transmission to these
markets. The hypothesis test of b3 þ b4 ¼ 0 is not rejected in most
of these markets. The Brazilian and Peruvian markets appear to
have consistently negative responses to US originated shocks even
during the crisis period, consistent with recent evidence that the
Latin American banking market was minimally effected by the
GFC (Kamil and Rai, 2010; Ocampo, 2009).
Almost all of the banking sectors show evidence of volatility
spillover effects during the non-crisis period, supporting the claim
that the inclusion of volatility transmission is important in the
model specification.7 During the non-crisis period the countries
which do not experience volatility spillovers are two Asian markets
and two Latin American markets – China and Pakistan and Argentina
and Peru. Clearly, the overall evidence presented here supports that
the banking sector in Peru is relatively isolated from international
capital markets.
The crisis also caused a structural shift as specified in (3); that is
b5 ¼ 0 is rejected for 25 of the 54 countries. Each of these countries
also have evidence of a break in the structural parameters (b2; b4
or p2). The evidence for structural shifts during the crisis period
is consistent with the occurrence of herding behavior in addition
to global shocks and the US idiosyncratic shocks during the GFC.
Table 2
Parameter estimates and hypothesis testing results.
SN Country b1 b2 b4 b5 p2 b2 ¼ b4 ¼ 0 b2 ¼ p2 ¼ 0 b4 ¼ p2 ¼ 0 b2 ¼ b4 ¼ p2 ¼ 0
Panel A: No contagion
1 Egypt 0.099*** 0.024 0.041 0.001 0.014 1.90 1.97 2.55 3.30
2 Hong Kong 0.511*** 0.066** 0.027 0.001** 0.002 4.79* 4.27 1.13 5.25
3 Hungary 0.578*** 0.045 0.150* 0.003*** 0.001 3.79 0.35 3.50 3.82
4 Israel 0.297*** 0.020 0.077 0.000 0.003 2.26 0.27 2.02 2.35
5 Malaysia 0.256*** 0.044 0.031 0.000 0.005 3.31 2.45 1.47 3.79
6 Singapore 0.472*** 0.036 0.015 0.000 0.003 0.64 1.12 0.62 1.17
7 Taiwan 0.445*** 0.013 0.064 0.000 0.018 1.23 2.17 3.45 3.47
8 Venezuela 0.036 0.008 0.019 0.000 0.014 0.31 1.81 1.99 2.02
Panel B: Volatility contagion driven
9 Indonesia 0.575*** 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.039*** 2.03 11.70*** 13.61*** 13.64***
10 Mexico 0.527*** 0.009 0.082** 0.000 0.062*** 3.99 18.87*** 22.68*** 22.71***
11 Russia 0.380*** 0.029 0.016 0.003*** 0.026** 0.22 6.81** 6.66** 6.91*
12 South Korea 0.880*** 0.111 0.078 0.003*** 0.077*** 3.18 26.88*** 25.60*** 27.78***
13 Sri Lanka 0.010 0.027 0.004 0.001*** 0.056*** 1.02 19.02*** 18.09*** 19.13***
Panel C: Systematic contagion driven
14 Canada 0.633*** 0.212*** 0.045 0.000 0.006 49.02*** 46.00*** 2.38 49.33***
15 Germany 0.703*** 0.195*** 0.086 0.001 0.001 12.67*** 10.73*** 2.62 12.84***
16 Peru 0.018 0.188*** 0.032 0.000 0.013 67.10*** 67.17*** 2.41 67.72***
17 Spain 0.678*** 0.225*** 0.027 0.001 0.005* 18.55*** 21.41*** 3.07 21.72***
Panel D: Idiosyncratic contagion driven
18 Chile 0.519*** 0.051 0.101*** 0.001* 0.006 9.58*** 2.65 8.20** 9.89**
19 France 0.673*** 0.040 0.161*** 0.002** 0.001 8.02** 0.64 7.83** 8.07**
20 Greece 0.496*** 0.082 0.200*** 0.001 0.007 16.68*** 2.89 15.09*** 18.12***
21 Italy 0.539*** 0.066 0.139*** 0.001* 0.001 10.72*** 1.80 9.61*** 10.98**
22 Malta 0.064*** 0.005 0.102*** 0.000 0.011 13.28*** 1.08 13.94*** 14.47***
23 Morocco 0.084*** 0.009 0.085*** 0.000 0.005 7.34** 0.29 6.98** 7.45*
24 Norway 0.491*** 0.081 0.407*** 0.001 0.002 34.87*** 1.29 34.24*** 35.35***
25 Poland 0.410*** 0.089 0.140** 0.002** 0.010 7.23** 2.55 5.39* 7.59*
26 South Africa 0.564*** 0.069 0.257*** 0.001 0.009 12.18*** 1.58 12.67*** 13.08***
27 UK 0.573*** 0.063 0.246*** 0.002*** 0.000 19.85*** 1.13 18.92*** 19.87***
28 Czech Rep 0.375*** 0.124** 0.174*** 0.000 0.003 12.36*** 4.21 7.03** 12.72***
29 Japan 0.716*** 0.095* 0.216*** 0.000 0.002 14.90*** 3.17 13.46*** 15.03***
30 Portugal 0.316*** 0.016 0.255*** 0.003*** 0.016* 36.19*** 3.45 41.10*** 41.17***
Panel E: Multiple drivers
31 Austria 0.324*** 0.328*** 0.261*** 0.002** 0.016 50.99*** 30.44*** 21.14*** 51.97***
32 Belgium 0.558*** 0.183*** 0.259*** 0.002*** 0.001 28.10*** 7.94** 19.39*** 28.19***
33 Cyprus 0.440*** 0.233*** 0.177*** 0.000 0.005 24.63*** 14.63*** 9.48*** 24.95***
34 Denmark 0.465*** 0.088* 0.204*** 0.002*** 0.012 20.14*** 5.24* 18.35*** 22.71***
35 Ireland 0.521*** 0.356*** 0.367*** 0.003*** 0.002 32.02*** 15.75*** 21.19*** 32.54***
36 Netherlands 0.668*** 0.253*** 0.165*** 0.002** 0.001 26.94*** 16.43*** 8.11** 26.96***
37 Pakistan 0.196*** 0.170*** 0.136*** 0.002*** 0.009 25.69*** 20.60*** 10.07*** 27.81***
38 Philippines 0.315*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.000 0.016 22.73*** 11.29*** 10.23*** 24.15***
39 Romania 0.165*** 0.359*** 0.227*** 0.002*** 0.019 64.26*** 48.07*** 18.37*** 69.00***
40 Slovenia 0.050** 0.108*** 0.147*** 0.000 0.027 39.53*** 15.21*** 25.18*** 41.64***
41 Switzerland 0.803*** 0.122** 0.128** 0.002*** 0.003 9.35*** 5.45* 6.42** 10.57**
42 Argentina 0.544*** 0.193*** 0.038 0.002*** 0.021** 19.78*** 25.80*** 6.40** 25.89***
43 Brazil 1.179*** 0.193*** 0.009 0.001 0.035*** 11.96*** 22.55*** 12.37*** 22.69***
44 China 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.018 0.000 0.084*** 7.10** 33.37*** 25.60*** 33.38***
45 Thailand 0.490*** 0.133** 0.037 0.000 0.047*** 6.59** 14.77*** 9.20** 14.99***
46 Australia 0.515*** 0.217*** 0.127*** 0.001 0.022** 27.16*** 23.46*** 13.08*** 33.70***
(continued on next page)
M
.D
ungey,D
.G
ajurel/Journal
of
Banking
&
Finance
60
(2015)
271–
283
275
Ta
bl
e
2
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
SN
C
ou
n
tr
y
b 1
b 2
b 4
b 5
p
2
b 2
¼
b 4
¼
0
b 2
¼
p
2
¼
0
b 4
¼
p
2
¼
0
b 2
¼
b 4
¼
p
2
¼
0
47
C
ol
om
bi
a
0.
00
0
0.
43
1*
**
0
.1
11
**
*
0.
00
0
0
.8
34
**
*
12
23
.2
9*
**
43
97
.5
5*
**
30
07
.6
9*
**
43
99
.5
1*
**
48
Fi
n
la
n
d
0.
34
0*
**
0.
11
4*
*
0.
30
2*
**
0
.0
01
0
.0
35
**
38
.7
1*
**
9.
38
**
*
7.
83
**
8.
07
**
49
In
di
a
0.
44
3*
**
0.
15
4*
*
0.
25
5*
**
0.
00
0
0
.0
36
**
*
22
.1
3*
**
13
.7
8*
**
24
.3
5*
**
32
.2
0*
**
50
B
u
lg
ar
ia
0.
04
9
0.
38
8*
**
0.
09
4*
0
.0
03
**
*
0
.0
62
**
*
49
.5
5*
**
55
.2
3*
**
12
.9
4*
**
60
.8
9*
**
51
Lu
xe
m
bu
rg
0.
16
2*
**
0.
11
8*
**
0.
15
0*
**
0
.0
01
**
*
0
.0
44
**
*
34
.9
1*
**
25
.5
7*
**
29
.5
6*
**
46
.5
0*
**
52
Sw
ed
en
0.
69
1*
**
0
.1
66
**
0.
26
3*
**
0
.0
02
**
0.
01
1*
*
22
.0
4*
**
11
.8
6*
**
21
.7
5*
**
27
.8
0*
**
53
Tu
rk
ey
0.
77
0*
**
0
.2
45
**
0.
20
5*
0
.0
01
0.
04
7*
**
8.
68
**
23
.5
7*
**
20
.6
0*
**
25
.6
4*
**
N
ot
e:
Th
e
va
lu
es
in
co
lu
m
n
fo
r
b 1
,b
2
;b
4
;b
5
an
d
p
2
ar
e
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
ti
m
at
es
an
d
va
lu
es
fo
r
jo
in
t
te
st
ar
e
th
e
C
h
i-
sq
u
ar
e
va
lu
es
.*
**
,*
*,
an
d
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
276 M. Dungey, D. Gajurel / Journal of Banking & Finance 60 (2015) 271–2833.1. Evidence of contagion
Table 2 shows that almost all of the 53 banking markets in the
sample experienced some form of contagion from the US. The null
of no contagion in any form – systematic, idiosyncratic or volatility
– given by the joint test for b2 ¼ b4 ¼ p2 ¼ 0, is rejected in 45 mar-
kets.8 The exceptions are Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Malay-
sia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Venezuela. These markets are generally
small economies yet display various levels of exposure to interna-
tional markets. Hong Kong, for example, is developed and strongly
influenced by international conditions, whereas Venezuela is a
developing closed economy. One outlier, however, is Malaysia; a rel-
atively large economy which had built significant buffers in the
aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997–98, and had little exposure to
US sub-prime loan products (Khoon and Mah-Hui, 2010). Also in
Asia, the financial hub of Singapore, had liquid and well capitalized
domestic banks and foreign banks with liquidity assurance from
their head office (a formal commitment required for licensing proce-
dure) which may have reduced the exposure of the Singaporean
banking sector to contagion. Hong Kong and Hungary represent
somewhat different cases in that the null hypothesis for the joint test
(b2 ¼ b4 ¼ p2 ¼ 0) is not rejected but the null hypothesis for individ-
ual univariate tests of contagion effects is rejected. In the case of
Hong Kong, the null of no systemic contagion b2 ¼ 0 is rejected;
and in the case of Hungary, the null of no idiosyncratic contagion,
b4 ¼ 0, is rejected. Despite the overall evidence for no contagion,
the Hong Kong banking sector displays sensitivity to global shocks
(fundamentals), and the Hungarian banking sector to US idiosyn-
cratic shocks. Our results for the banking sectors in these countries
are consistent with the IMF Country Reports for 2008 and 2009 for
these countries which suggest that their banking sectors performed
well during the crisis, an outcome often attributed in the discourse
to effective policy initiatives.
Fig. 1 provides a schematic representation of the clustering of
the different individual coefficient hypothesis testing results for
systematic contagion, idiosyncratic contagion and volatility
contagion, to provide a convenient means of discussion. The
distinction between bold and plain text relates to the links to iden-
tified systemic banking crises are discussed below.
3.1.1. Volatility contagion driven
A small group of countries (Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South
Korea and Sri Lanka) have contagion effects driven largely by
volatility contagion. These countries do not have level effects – that
is no evidence of either systematic contagion or idiosyncratic con-
tagion.9 With the exception of Sri Lanka, the countries in this group
are markets which were involved in financial crises during the 1990s
and may have learned from that experience. However, the high level
of market uncertainty caused by the GFC resulted in increased mar-
ket volatility in these countries. The literature suggests that the
banking systems in Indonesia and South Korea in particular were rel-
atively healthy and had less exposure to US sub-prime products
(IMF, 2009a,b). In the case of Mexico, although the aggregate econ-
omy was hit hard, the banking sector was relatively resilient during
the crisis (IMF, 2009c).
3.1.2. Systematic contagion driven
A further small group of countries (Canada, Germany, Peru, and
Spain) have evidence of contagion effects driven largely by system-
atic contagion. These are large advanced economies (except Peru8 We also consider potential joint tests incorporating b5, such as
b2 ¼ b4 ¼ b5 ¼ p2 ¼ 0; b2 ¼ b4 ¼ b5 ¼ 0. The results are similar as b5 is mostly
accompanied by some other contagion estimates (b2; b4, or p2).
9 When we look at univariate hypothesis testing, however, the null for no
idiosyncratic contagion (b4 ¼ 0) is rejected for Mexico.
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ing linkages. It may be that these linkages are sufficient to enable
systematic contagion to effect the domestic markets. None of these
markets experienced idiosyncratic contagion. Despite the fact that
the German banking sector experienced huge losses – about 57
percent of stock market capitalization for banking sector stocks –
and German banks were highly involved in asset backed securities,
we do not find a statistically significant result for idiosyncratic con-
tagion from the US to Germany. The German banking system forms
the basis of its capital markets, and during the crisis German banks
faced problems with leverage, liquidity and funding (Acharya and
Schnabl, 2010).
In Spain, the direct impact of the crisis on the banking sector
was limited as the banks had a retail-oriented business model
and negligible exposure to US sub-prime mortgages (Acharya and
Schnabl, 2010; IMF, 2009d). However, when the crisis spread to
the global financial conditions and the real sector, it was transmit-
ted to the Spanish banking sector through common conditions
such as tighter liquidity. The Spanish banking sector additionally
experienced volatility contagion in response to the higher turmoil
in the US markets. A possible alternative explanation for the finan-
cial crisis in Spain was via an independent but coincidental col-
lapse in the Spanish housing market, causing turmoil in Spanish
markets. However, many of the Spanish problems were exacer-
bated by the dependence of the banking sector on international
markets as a source of funding for housing development, a strategy
that caused significant stress in the period after the collapse of
Northern Rock in late 2007. Further, Allen and Carletti (2010) argue
that the conditions behind the apparently coincidental housing
price booms in a number of countries is the consequence of inter-
national credit conditions and inappropriately loose monetary pol-
icy affecting those jurisdictions.10 The intertwining of domestic and
international shocks is important in understanding the details of the
individual crises for each specific country, but the presence of so
many contemporaneous crisis conditions strongly supports the
hypothesis that these crises are not coincidentally independent, as
statistically demonstrated in Dungey et al. (2015). However, a
potential limitation of our analysis is that if there are coincidental
crises caused by alternative pathways, these cannot be separately
identified with this approach; see for example the analysis of
German Landesbanken in Puri et al. (2011).
In the case of the Canadian banking system, despite its close
proximity to the US (with strong real and financial linkages), it
avoided crisis effects. Canadian banks follow relatively conserva-
tive banking practices with strong prudential regulation, and con-
sequently had lower exposure to sub-prime effects than the US
(IMF, 2009e).11 Laeven and Valencia (2013) consider a banking crisis as systemic if (i) there is
financial distress (as indicated by bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or
bank liquidations), and (ii) there is a policy intervention in response to significant
losses in the banking system. Output losses are computed as the cumulative sum of3.1.3. Idiosyncratic contagion driven
In about one-fifth of the countries US idiosyncratic shocks
played a dominant role during the crisis. Countries in this group
have a high level of global integration, are advanced and relatively
large: including a host of European countries (Czech Republic,
France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and UK) as
well as Japan and Chile. Countries in this group did not generally
experience systematic contagion (except the Czech Republic and
Japan) or volatility contagion (except Portugal). Since the banking
fundamentals of these countries were generally strong (Chile,
Japan, France, and Italy), and banks follow a traditional retail
business model, these banking systems were relatively resilient
to the crisis. Consequently, the large drop in banking sector returns10 They give the example of European monetary policy being too loose for Spain and
Ireland but appropriate for Germany and France, leading to housing price booms in
the former but not the latter.during the crisis was directly attributable to the idiosyncratic
shocks originating in the US banking sector.
The impact of these shocks are highly varied, reflecting that this
effect picks up the different nature and response of a great variety
of markets which is precisely why their responses are idiosyn-
cratic. For example, markets are observed to have different
banking ownership structures (dominated by foreign banks versus
dominated by domestic banks), different concentration, different
underlying product offerings (the dominance of fixed or variable
rate mortgage rate products varies greatly (Warnock and
Warnock, 2008)), face different regulatory structures and different
legal environments.
3.1.4. Multiple drivers
The final group consists of all those countries where the null
hypothesis of joint tests (bivariate and multivariate test) is rejected
in all cases. All the countries in this group experienced systematic
contagion and the majority of the countries are part of the
European Union. Eight countries (Australia, Bulgaria, Colombia,
Finland, India, Luxemburg, Sweden and Turkey) have all effects
- that is the null hypothesis is rejected in univariate, bivariate
and multivariate hypothesis tests. Four countries (Argentina,
Brazil, China and Thailand) have no idiosyncratic contagion from
the US (univariate test) and 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania,
Slovenia, and Switzerland) have no volatility contagion.
4. Contagion and the systemic banking crises
4.1. Contagion and the cost of crisis
We couple the evidence for contagion in the banking system
with the banking system crisis data in Laeven and Valencia
(2013) to address the relationship between channels of contagion
and the presence and cost of banking crises. The loss in economic
activity through this crisis period ranges from 0 to over 100
percent of GDP for the sample countries (see Table 3). In terms of
earlier periods of systemic risk and major banking crises, the
evidence for impact on economic activity is mixed. Cecchetti
et al. (2009) document losses of up to 27 percent of GDP during
an associated recession, but again some countries experience no
loss. Of the 45 banking markets in our sample which experienced
contagion in any form, 18 of these banking markets experienced
a banking system crisis during the GFC as documented in Laeven
and Valencia (2013). The average output loss for these countries
is about 30 percent of GDP and the average fiscal cost is about 7
percent of GDP.11
Fig. 1 highlights in bold the countries which experienced sys-
temic banking crises within each of the channels of contagion.
The majority of the countries which experienced a banking crisis
are clustered in two groups; either experiencing both idiosyncratic
and systematic contagion (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland,
Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland) or idiosyncratic contagion only
(France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK). Seven of 12 countries
in the systematic and idiosyncratic contagion group experienced a
banking crisis. Table 3 shows that the average output loss (as a pro-
portion of GDP) for these countries was almost 34 percent, andthe differences between actual and trend real GDP over the crisis period and the fiscal
costs are defined as the component of gross fiscal outlays related to the restructuring
of the financial sector. They include fiscal costs associated with bank recapitalization
but exclude asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. See
Laeven and Valencia (2013) for details.
Fig. 1. Univariate hypothesis test.
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this rises to around 39 percent. The standard deviation of the
output loss in this group is high, at 34 percent. The five countries
which experience a banking crisis with only idiosyncratic
contagion have a similar output loss of 33 percent, but a much
lower standard deviation of this loss at almost 9 percent. The
other forms of contagion associate less strongly with banking
crises than these two categories, with volatility contagion rela-
tively unimportant.
The evidence from Fig. 1 and Table 3 indicates that banking
crises in this sample are frequently associated with idiosyncratic
contagion - which tends to result in output loss. However, when
this is coupled with the presence of systematic contagion, there
is great uncertainty about the output loss, in our sample the output
loss for this group ranges from nothing in Switzerland to 106
percent of GDP in Ireland. By contrast, when only idiosyncratic
contagion is associated with a banking crisis, the range for output
loss is smaller, between 20 and 40 percent of GDP.
The fiscal costs associated with the countries experiencing a
banking crisis do not show this distinction between the dominant
types of contagion; the average fiscal costs are 8 percent or 10 per-
cent of GDP for countries with both systemic and idiosyncratic
contagion or idiosyncratic contagion only. These results point to
the importance of understanding the source of contagion and its
links to banking crises. For policy makers, it appears that the
maximum uncertainty about the outcome of a banking crisis
occurs when both idiosyncratic and systematic contagion affect
the market.
4.2. Contagion, industry characteristics and the systemic crises
In this section we formalize the discussion from the previous
section and examine the empirical evidence for the transmission
of banking crises via different contagion channels incorporating
industry characteristics as control variables using a Probit model
as follows:
PrðBankCrisisi ¼ 1Þ ¼ Uðco þ X0ikþW 0ihþ Z0idÞ ð6Þ
where Xi is a vector of indicator variables representing the conta-
gion measures identified in the previous section, taking the value
of 1 when that contagion channel is statistically significant in the
first stage regressions (we exclude the volatility channel as it is
completely coincident with all occurrences and non-occurrences
of crisis), Wi is a vector of banking industry characteristics, Zi, is a
vector of macroeconomic control variables; k, h, and d are the
vectors of weights on each of these effects, and U is the cumulative
distribution function of a standard normal random variable. The
data for banking industry characteristics and control variables
are from Cihak et al. (2012) and are available from the World Bank
website. 12 Motivated by Beck et al. (2006), Berger and Bouwman
(2013), Caprio et al. (2014) and Lepetit et al. (2008), we consider
market concentration, bank capital, credit growth, bank income
structure, and non-performing loans to characterize the banking
industry, whilst the relative size of the banking sector, credit growth
rate and external debt exposure are taken as macroeconomic control
variables.13 Table 4 provides a brief data description for the selected
control variables. A detailed data description is available in Cihak12 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development.
13 There is a growing body of literature that examines macro-financial linkages. For
example, Beck et al. (2006) examine the relationship between the banking industry
structure and the banking crisis for 69 countries from 1980 to 1997 covering 47
banking crisis episodes over the period. Caprio et al. (2014) examines the macro-
financial determinants of financial crises using the data for 83 countries over the
period 1998 to 2006. In our paper, we have used the data for systemic banking crisis
within the GFC period (2007–2009). Hence, our sample size limited us from including
more control variables in the probit model.et al. (2012) or on the Global Financial Development Database
(GFDD) of the World Bank website. The control variables are kept
at their pre-crisis period average.
Five specifications of the model are presented in Table 5. Spec-
ification (1) presents the marginal effects where only contagion
channels are present, specifications (2) and (3) extend this model
to include selected market control variables. Potential multi-
collinearity between bank capital and non-performing loan and
credit growth motivate the different control variables used in these
two specifications (Aebi et al., 2012; Bruyckere et al., 2013;
Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). Specification (4) provides the full set of
X;W; Z variables, and finally, column (5) reports on results with
the addition of an interaction term between idiosyncratic conta-
gion and regulatory capital.14
The probit model results reported in Table 5 support the
hypothesis that idiosyncratic contagion is an important avenue
for systemic banking crises. The presence of idiosyncratic conta-
gion (a shock transmitted from the crisis-originating country),
increases the probability of systemic banking crisis in a country
by almost 37 percent. The contribution of systematic contagion,
however is not statistically significant at conventional levels which
suggests that increased interdependence among banking sectors
does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system. This
does not necessarily mean that the potential for systematic conta-
gion should be paid less attention by policy makers; other evidence
suggests that policy initiatives taken during the global financial
crisis contributed to reduced tail risk in the financial system
(Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011; Klyuev et al., 2009).14 In addition to the list of control variables in Table 4, we also considered other
variables such as bank liquidity (ratio of liquid assets total asset) and foreign bank
subsidiaries (ratio of foreign banks assets to total banks assets). We also considered
potential interaction between control variables and different forms of contagion.
However, none of these effects were statistically significant and did not change the
other results. In the interests of preserving degrees of freedom and space they are not
reported here.
Table 3
Cost of systemic banking system crisis.
Output
loss
Fiscal
cost
Output
loss
Fiscal
cost
Systematic and idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic only
Austria 14 4.9 France 23 1
Belgium 19 6 Greece 43 27.3
Denmark 36 3.1 Hungary 40 2.7
Ireland 106 40.7 Italy 32 0.3
Netherlands 23 12.7 UK 25 8.8
Slovenia 38 3.6 Average 32.6 8.0
Switzerland 0 1.1 St. dev. 8.8 11.3
Average 33.7 10.3
St. dev. 34.4 13.9 Systematic and volatility
Average (excl.
Swiss)
39.3 11.8 Spain 39 3.8
St. dev. 34.0 14.6
All forms of contagion
Systematic only Luxembourg 36 7.7
Germany 11 1.8 Sweden 25 0.7
Average 30.5 4.2
Idiosyncratic and volatility stdev 7.8 4.9
Portugal 37 0
Overall
Volatility only Average 30.4 7.1
Russia 0 2.3 St. dev. 23.0 10.6
Note: Output loss and fiscal cost are expressed in percent of GDP. Data source:
(Laeven and Valencia, 2013).
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evidence that crises transmitted via idiosyncratic shocks may
destabilize the domestic financial system, and policies designed
to reduce the potential for idiosyncratic contagion may result in
a reduced impact on domestic economies.
We specifically test the hypotheses in the existing literature
that larger, more concentrated banking sectors with lower engage-
ment in shadow banking activities and higher regulatory capital
will have lower probability of crisis occurrence (Acharya et al.,
2010; Allen and Gale, 2000; Beck et al., 2006; Berger and
Bouwman, 2013; Bretschger et al., 2012; Cole, 2012; Bruyckere
et al., 2013; De Jonghe, 2010; Lepetit et al., 2008; Miles et al.,
2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013). The results show support for the
hypothesis that higher regulatory bank capital reduces the likeli-
hood of a systemic banking crisis by about 15 percent.15 In addi-
tion, bank capital also helps to reduce the contribution of
idiosyncratic contagion to the risk of banking crises; the interaction
term between idiosyncratic contagion and regulatory capital has a
significantly negative marginal effect. However, higher market con-
centration results in only a small reduction in the probability of a cri-
sis, statistically significant at the 10 percent level; providing limited
support for the hypothesis that market concentration decreases the
probability of a banking crisis.16 The size of the banking sector (given
by the banking sector to GDP ratio) has no significant effect. While
the results for the non-interest income to total income ratio variable
are uniformly significant across all the specifications, the marginal
effects indicate that where the banking sector engages less in retail
banking activities and more in shadow banking activities the proba-
bility of a systemic crisis is increased by almost 2 percent. The non-
performing loan ratio and private credit growth variables have no
statistically significant marginal effects. Finally, the statistically sig-
nificant (at 10 percent) marginal impact of the external debt to GDP
ratio on the probability of banking crisis supports the hypothesised
feedback loop between sovereign debt and banking crises (Acharya
et al., 2014; Adler, 2012).
In summary, the results show that the existence of idiosyncratic
contagion during a crisis provides a statistically significant contri-
bution to increasing the probability of a banking crisis in the recip-
ient country, of 37 percent. Thus, idiosyncratic contagion is an
important channel, worthy of policy makers’ attention to mitigate
the effects of foreign sourced crises on domestic economies. The
usual finding that good macroeconomic policy settings, such as
influence the external debt to GDP ratio, is confirmed. As the liter-
ature suggests, higher regulatory capital can play a significant off-
setting role in reducing banking crises, although there may be a
potential cost through the changing nature of banks’ behavior in
international markets and/or reducing international banking
relationships; see for example Aiyar et al. (2014) and Ongena
et al. (2013). Proposals around the size of the banking sector,
market structure and relative engagement in shadow banking are
economically less significant in this analysis.
5. Robustness check
The analysis presented thus far is robust to a number of checks
already presented in the discussion; in particular the specification
of the GARCH as either EGARCH(1,1) or TARCH reported in Sec-
tion 2.2; the choice of global factor data reported in Section 2.3;
the definition of bank concentration and bank capital, and choice
of dating for the control variables in Section 4.2. We have also con-
sidered changing the start point of the crisis period to August 9,15 The result is robust to the use of equity capital to total asset ratio as an alternative
measure of bank capital.
16 For robustness, we considered the alternatives of the 5 largest banks based
concentration ratio. The results are very similar.2007; which is the point at which the ECB first intervened in the
markets in response to the worsening credit conditions. The results
are very similar to those reported in Table 2.
In this section we perform a more significant analysis on the
impact of splitting the crisis sample into two sub-samples. Authors
such as Claessens et al. (2010) and Mishkin (2011) suggest splitting
the crisis into phases: the turmoil phase (from August 2007 to mid
September 2008, until the demise of Lehman Brothers) and the
acute phase (after the collapse of Lehman Brothers until May
2009), where the end point is consistent with the end of the reces-
sion in the US. The turmoil period (Phase I) captures the sub-prime
crisis, and its effects on financial markets worldwide. For example,
August 2007 is characterized by a credit freeze in interbank mar-
kets; central banks provided substantial liquidity support to the
banks and governments took action to rescue financial institutions
such as ABN Amro in the Netherlands, Northern Rock in the UK,
and Bear Stearns in the US. The acute period (Phase II) consists of
the period following the failure of Lehman Brothers, when turmoil
in financial markets led to the failure of a large number of financial
institutions globally, government intervention in the form of bail-
outs, deposit guarantees, liquidity support and capital injections,
and a severe contraction in the real economy. The empirical litera-
ture documents that the policy initiatives were largely effective in
reducing the systemic nature of the crisis (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012;
Klyuev et al., 2009). If that is the case, we are less likely to find
evidence for contagion during the second phase of the crisis, but
rather to find evidence for turmoil in the markets themselves.
To incorporate two phases of crisis in our model, we extend (3)
and (5) as follows:
rj;t ¼ b0;j þ b1;jf globalt þ b2;jf globalt I1t þ b3;jf globalt I2t þ b4;jf USt
þ b5;jf USt I1t þ b6;jf USt I2t þ b7;jI1t þ b8;jI2t þ nj;t ð7Þlnðr2j;tÞ ¼ c0;j þ c1;jðjzj;t1j  Ejzj;t1jÞ þ c2;jzj;t1 þ c3;jlnðr2j;t1Þ
þ p1;jlnðr^2US;tÞ þ p2;jlnðr^2US;tÞI1t þ p3;jlnðr^2US;tÞI2t ð8Þ
where I1 and I2 are binary indicator functions for Phase I and Phase
II respectively. We consider July 19, 2007 to September 12, 2008 as
Phase I and September 15, 2008 to May 8, 2009 as Phase II.
Table 4
Control variables: Code, definition and description.
Variables Definition and description GFDD Series code
Market concentration Market share of 3 largest banks in terms of total assets; ratio of assets of three largest commercial banks to total
commercial banking assets. Total assets include total earning assets, cash and receivables from banks, foreclosed real
estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax assets, discontinued operations and
other assets
GFDD.OI.01
Regulatory capital The ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets; the capital adequacy of deposit takers; ratio of total regulatory
capital to assets held, weighted according to the risk of those assets
GFDD.SI.05
Non-interest income Ratio of non-interest income to total income; the non-interest income of banks includes net gains on trading,
derivatives and other securities, net fees and commissions and other operating income
GFDD.EI.03
Non-performing loan Non-performing loan to total gross loan; non-performing loan refers to the loans on which payments of interest and
principal past due by 90 days or more; the loan amount recorded as non-performing includes the gross value of the
loan as recorded on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is overdue
GFDD.SI.02
Private Credit Growth Percentage change in private credit to GDP ratio; private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to GDP
GFDD.DI.12
Banking Assets/GDP Ratio of total banking assets to GDP; the banks include commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept
transferable deposits, such as demand deposits
GFDD.DI.02
External Debt Ratio of outstanding external private debt to GDP; the external private debt includes long-term bonds and notes and
money market instruments issued in international markets
GFDD.DM.05
Note: The GFDD compiles data from different sources such as Bankscope, BIS, Global Financial Stability Report, and International Financial Statistics (IMF). For more detail, see
Cihak et al. (2012).
Table 5
Probit model results: Marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Systemic banking crisis dummy
Systematic Contagion 0.0438 0.1503 0.1605
(0.128) (0.157) (0.183)
Idiosyncratic Contagion 0.3188*** 0.4735*** 0.3655***
(0.115) (0.147) (0.158)
Shift Contagion 0.451*** 0.2592 0.2618
(0.117) (0.165) (0.171)
Market Concentration 0.0067* 0.0052 0.012** 0.0126**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Asset 0.1195*** 0.1412*** 0.1493**
(0.035) (0.052) (0.059)
Non-interest Income/Total Income 0.0166** 0.0127* 0.0188** 0.0189**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Non-performing Loan 0.0043
(0.025)
Private Credit Growth 0.0051
(0.014)
Idio. Contaigon x Regulatory Capital 0.0128**
(0.007)
Banking Asset/GDP 0.0044 0.0048** 0.002 0.0021
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
External Debt/GDP 0.0173** 0.0212*** 0.0147** 0.015*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
N 53 43 40 42 42
Wald Chi-Sq 11.54 17.81 14.99 17.14 18.16
p-value 0.009 0.003 0.020 0.029 0.033
Pseudo R-sq 0.309 0.574 0.5182 0.697 0.697
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II. During Phase I of the GFC, 28 markets experienced systematic
contagion, 35 markets experienced idiosyncratic contagion, 31
markets experienced shift contagion and 20 markets experienced
volatility contagion. During Phase II of the GFC, 25 markets experi-
enced systematic contagion, 22 markets experienced idiosyncratic
contagion, 11 markets experienced shift contagion and 36 markets
experienced volatility contagion.
The overall results show that during the first phase of the crisis
idiosyncratic and systematic contagion dominate, along with
structural shifts, in a manner very close to the results reported in
the main body of the paper. The second phase predominantly
shows evidence of volatility contagion. This is consistent with
underlying uncertainty in the market during this time. Theunconventional policy measures which aimed to reduce market
uncertainty resulted in a degree of policy uncertainty due to lack
of experience with the approaches implemented around the globe;
see the critique in Allen and Carletti (2010). Not only were these
policies aimed at reducing systematic effects through global expo-
sure (such as limiting capital flows), these policies also acted to
reduce the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks.
Unfortunately it is not straightforward to align the two phase
crisis results with the evidence for systemic banking crises in
Laeven and Valencia (2013) as the data do not allow a clear
distinction between the phases. Highly detailed data such as that
collected by Ureche-Rangau and Burietz (2013) for 11 major
European countries would be required to conduct such an analysis.
However, the evidence for the probit model on the probability of
Table 6
Contagion results based on 2 phases of the GFC.
Country b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 p1 p2 p3
Argentina 0.543*** 0.164*** 0.245*** 0.084* 0.082 0.008 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.016 0.021** 0.013
Australia 0.513*** 0.409*** 0.101 0.040 0.171*** 0.140** 0.001* 0.000 0.157*** 0.026*** 0.056***
Austria 0.315*** 0.271*** 0.441*** 0.030 0.309*** 0.108 0.003*** 0.002 0.196*** 0.025* 0.177***
Belgium 0.560*** 0.046 0.486*** 0.144*** 0.287*** 0.154* 0.003*** 0.001 0.058*** 0.001 0.019**
Brazil 1.181*** 0.026 0.290*** 0.105** 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.154*** 0.029*** 0.040**
Bulgaria 0.043 0.425*** 0.390*** 0.155*** 0.177*** 0.018 0.003*** 0.003* 0.053 0.064*** 0.217***
Canada 0.634*** 0.157*** 0.247*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.129*** 0.003 0.039**
Chile 0.516*** 0.023 0.106** 0.157*** 0.140*** 0.088** 0.001 0.000 0.190*** 0.007 0.031
China 0.129*** 0.534*** 0.046 0.025 0.066 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.084* 0.076*** 0.104***
Colombia 0.000 0.113*** 0.491*** 0.000 0.022 0.180*** 0.000 0.000 0.042** 0.609*** 0.985***
Cyprus 0.442*** 0.301*** 0.062 0.007 0.184*** 0.145* 0.000 0.004** 0.084*** 0.003 0.037**
Czech Rep. 0.368*** 0.150** 0.105 0.017 0.214*** 0.155 0.000 0.002 0.077** 0.006 0.135***
Denmark 0.465*** 0.015*** 0.164* 0.052 0.275*** 0.095 0.002*** 0.002 0.186*** 0.009 0.058***
Egypt 0.096*** 0.005 0.077** 0.042 0.036 0.053 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.014 0.019
Finland 0.342*** 0.119* 0.110 0.006 0.438*** 0.158** 0.002** 0.000 0.172*** 0.038*** 0.136***
France 0.672*** 0.049 0.136 0.267*** 0.228*** 0.048 0.003*** 0.002 0.057*** 0.000 0.012**
Germany 0.703*** 0.284*** 0.038 0.218*** 0.080 0.097 0.002** 0.000 0.023** 0.000 0.010**
Greece 0.483*** 0.089 0.002 0.009 0.193*** 0.161** 0.001 0.006*** 0.099*** 0.012 0.080***
Hong Kong 0.510*** 0.053 0.051 0.088*** 0.019 0.043 0.001* 0.000 0.050*** 0.004 0.031***
Hungary 0.573*** 0.055 0.038 0.110* 0.164* 0.189 0.003*** 0.003 0.111*** 0.005 0.159***
Indonesia 0.574*** 0.081 0.096 0.027 0.168** 0.047 0.000 0.002 0.176*** 0.035*** 0.025
India 0.429*** 0.546*** 0.067 0.100* 0.526*** 0.173** 0.002 0.001 0.018 0.036*** 0.086***
Ireland 0.507*** 0.225** 0.453** 0.176*** 0.437*** 0.068 0.004*** 0.011* 0.145*** 0.007 0.082***
Israel 0.295*** 0.118* 0.141** 0.102** 0.102 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.064** 0.006 0.055***
Italy 0.539*** 0.143** 0.109 0.094*** 0.146*** 0.101 0.001*** 0.000 0.040*** 0.001 0.011*
Japan 0.710*** 0.226*** 0.214*** 0.204*** 0.437*** 0.162** 0.001 0.001 0.056*** 0.005 0.010
Luxemburg 0.163*** 0.220*** 0.082** 0.102*** 0.134*** 0.164*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.099** 0.048*** 0.090***
Malaysia 0.255*** 0.089** 0.040 0.025 0.124*** 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.087*** 0.006 0.021
Malta 0.064*** 0.011 0.033 0.106*** 0.098*** 0.121*** 0.000 0.002** 0.039 0.010 0.059***
Mexico 0.526*** 0.149*** 0.123*** 0.094*** 0.062 0.130*** 0.001 0.000 0.185*** 0.057*** 0.012
Morocco 0.084*** 0.002 0.021 0.099*** 0.040 0.143*** 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.066***
Netherlands 0.669*** 0.011 0.513*** 0.269*** 0.054 0.220*** 0.001** 0.001 0.015 0.001 0.004
Norway 0.494*** 0.162** 0.378** 0.000 0.341*** 0.411*** 0.002** 0.001 0.124*** 0.015 0.178***
Pakistan 0.198*** 0.071 0.183*** 0.161*** 0.156** 0.147*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.023 0.006 0.025**
Peru 0.018 0.217*** 0.173*** 0.066*** 0.035 0.030 0.001** 0.001** 0.066 0.011 0.006
Philippines 0.316*** 0.323*** 0.063 0.079** 0.239*** 0.067 0.001 0.001 0.208*** 0.010 0.006
Poland 0.402*** 0.048 0.115 0.102** 0.158** 0.070 0.002** 0.003 0.198*** 0.008 0.218***
Portugal 0.315*** 0.095 0.043 0.014 0.300*** 0.208*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.175*** 0.019** 0.041**
Romania 0.165*** 0.468*** 0.190** 0.077* 0.275*** 0.162** 0.003*** 0.002 0.035 0.020* 0.087***
Russia 0.374*** 0.002 0.051 0.156*** 0.079 0.182* 0.003*** 0.004 0.137*** 0.031*** 0.043**
South Africa 0.562*** 0.082 0.046 0.069 0.281*** 0.273*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.076** 0.014 0.090***
Korea 0.864*** 0.161** 0.039 0.051 0.139* 0.056 0.003*** 0.005* 0.303*** 0.076*** 0.032
Sweden 0.682*** 0.271*** 0.021 0.159*** 0.267*** 0.213** 0.003*** 0.003 0.130*** 0.010* 0.024**
Singapore 0.471*** 0.022 0.047 0.071** 0.044 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.043*** 0.002 0.012
Slovenia 0.049** 0.081** 0.167*** 0.136*** 0.154*** 0.134*** 0.000 0.002* 0.224*** 0.031 0.082**
Spain 0.675*** 0.284*** 0.135 0.213*** 0.016 0.054 0.001* 0.000 0.040*** 0.004 0.005
Sri Lanka 0.008 0.017 0.118*** 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.022 0.057*** 0.011
Sweden 0.682*** 0.271*** 0.021 0.159*** 0.267*** 0.213** 0.003*** 0.003 0.130*** 0.010* 0.024**
Switzerland 0.802*** 0.161** 0.147 0.312*** 0.168*** 0.013 0.003*** 0.000 0.051*** 0.003 0.010
Taiwan 0.441*** 0.065 0.019 0.012 0.073 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.142*** 0.015 0.013
Thailand 0.482*** 0.053 0.201*** 0.000 0.178*** 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.157*** 0.047*** 0.014
Turkey 0.769*** 0.050 0.388*** 0.079 0.398*** 0.073 0.002* 0.001 0.227*** 0.047*** 0.056***
UK 0.572*** 0.023 0.122 0.239*** 0.297*** 0.082 0.003*** 0.000 0.042*** 0.002 0.012**
Venezuela 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.025 0.001*** 0.000 0.194*** 0.007 0.015
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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from the first phase of the crisis is qualitatively similar to that
presented in the main body of the paper - idiosyncratic contagion
and bank capital appear as significant contributors to the systemic
crisis. These results are available from the authors on request.
6. Conclusions
This paper implements a CAPM based modeling framework that
encapsulates several alternative channels of contagion and relates
them to the observed evidence for banking crises for 54 countries
during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. We determine that
banking crises have a strong positive correlation with the idiosyn-
cratic contagion emanating from crisis-originating countries.
Idiosyncratic contagion represents the unanticipated impact of
shocks affecting the crisis originating market, in this case the USbanking sector, and transmitted to other banking sectors. It is
differentiated from the transmission of common shocks that hit
global markets, which we denote as systematic contagion. It also
differs from general shifts in the market conditions, known as shift
contagion, and transmission via changes in market volatility, or
volatility contagion. The framework we implement, distinguishes
each of these four channels of contagion and finds that although
there appears to be clustered evidence for effects of both system-
atic and idiosyncratic contagion on the probability of banking
crises, statistically, only the links with idiosyncratic contagion
are significant. It is entirely possible that this result partly arises
from the efforts of policy makers around the globe to contain the
systematic effects of the crisis, thus dampening the systematic
channel.
Our results provide evidence for the severity of the 2007–2009
crisis. Banking sectors across the world were disturbed by the crisis
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sample banking markets experienced a break in global systematic
risk exposure, and about 60 percent of banking markets experi-
enced idiosyncratic contagion originating from the US banking
market. While most banking markets show evidence of volatility
spillovers from the US banking markets during periods of market
calm, only about 40 percent of sample banking markets experi-
enced volatility contagion during the crisis. We established that
evidence of a banking crisis seemed to be related to two clusters
of economies - one which experienced both systematic and
idiosyncratic contagion, and one which experienced idiosyncratic
contagion only. While the average output loss of banking crises
on these two groups of countries was quite similar, at about one-
third, the standard deviation of this loss was very different. The
group of countries which experienced only idiosyncratic contagion
were more likely to experience an average loss - that is, the range
of output loss experienced was much smaller than that of the
countries where systematic contagion was also significant. When
we split the sample into two sub-periods these results are pre-
served for the first phase of the crisis, but in the period following
the demise of Lehman Brothers the major effect is volatility trans-
mission. Our conclusions on the impact of regulatory variables are
preserved.
The idiosyncratic shocks channel is empirically an important
link in transmitting shocks across international banking sectors,
and is strongly related to the subsequent occurrence of a banking
crisis in the recipient country. Concentrated banking sectors,
strong regulatory capital requirements and a concentration in
retail banking income help to reduce the likelihood of systemic cri-
sis, consistent with the existing evidence. However, there is evi-
dently more that can be done by policy in identifying and
defusing the transmission of country specific idiosyncratic shocks
that are potential sources of idiosyncratic contagion so as to reduce
the costs of any consequent banking crises.References
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